Voices: After the ‘double-tap’ pager and walkie-talkie attacks, how will Hezbollah hit back?
Few know what must be going through the mind of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah – Shia cleric and the leader of Hezbollah since 1992 – except, fairly obviously some sense of humiliation and some trepidation about the “double tap” Israeli attack via pagers and walkie-talkies.
Bizarre and audacious as the Israeli operation has been, it is also a serious matter – and a possible precursor to a renewed Israeli assault on Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon and perhaps even further afield. Thousands of these electronic devices exploding has caused so much death and injury to Hezbollah members (and bystanders) that it can hardly go unanswered; but how serious should the “punishment” by the Sheikh be?
To a fair degree it will be up to the Iranian leadership, who have been sponsors, mentors and quartermasters to Hezbollah for many decades. If past experience is anything to go by, the response will be deadly and look impressive, but also rather tokenistic, relatively ineffective and pitched in such a way as not to provoke a further escalation from Israel.
That was what happened most dramatically after the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran – and a huge missile strike direct from Iran to Israeli territory mostly bounced off Israeli’s “iron dome” defence shield. The Iranians were probably looking for a slightly bigger hit rate, but they didn’t (and don’t) want to provoke an all-out conflict with Israel at this juncture.
The considerable delay before they attempted to exact any revenge for Haniyeh, during which tempers cooled somewhat, was also indicative of some uncertainty about how to calibrate the attack. It’s also noticeable that the Houthis in Yemen, also allied to Iran, have been relatively quiescent having suffered some punishment bombardment by Israel. At any rate, there was no significant Israeli response – and the war in Gaza, tragically, continues.
How big an assault on Hezbollah Israel is planning is hard to judge, but the Netanyahu administration has a vested political interest in war, or at least trying to demonstrate something approximating to victory over its enemies. After almost a year of the most horrific fighting in Gaza, in which more than 40,000 Palestinians have died and the territory has been reduced to a wasteland, Hamas has certainly suffered losses, including some senior figures; but it has not been destroyed. The remaining hostages remain in captivity, much to the anger of the Israeli people.
Netanyahu’s stated war aims have not been achieved – and Israel is demonstrably less secure and the region less stable than it was a year ago. The Israeli premier has managed to fall out with his friends in the region and even the White House. Strategically, you could argue that Hamas has gained more out of this conflict than Israeli – especially when you remember that they, Hamas, have no concern for the welfare of the Palestinian people. Maybe Netanyahu thinks he will have more success if he opens another front, making a peace deal for Gaza even more remote.
Militarily, things are brewing on Israel’s Northern front. The Israeli defence minister, Yoav Gallant, says “we are diverting forces, resources, and energy toward the north”, and elite Israeli troops are heading towards Lebanon.
So whether Hezbollah and Iran like it or want it or not, Netanyahu seems determined to take the war to them, exploit Israel’s technological superiority (as seen with the pager detonations) and make a show of defending Israelis who have been attacked and driven from their homes in the region. Indeed, the Israeli air force has already bombed sites in southern Lebanon.
It is much more about politics than any conceivable military “solution” to the situation in the Middle East. As with the Gaza invasion, it will leave Israel even more isolated. For all his bellicose posturing, Netanyahu is gambling with the security of the state of Israel and the welfare of its people.